@Article{mfj:647,
title={Ownership Structure, Managerial Turnover and Takeovers: Further U.K. Evidence on the Market for Corporate Control},
author={Jay Dahya and Ronan Powell},
journal={Multinational Finance Journal},
volume={2},
number={1/1},
pages={62--83},
year=1998,
publisher={Multinational Finance Society; Global Business Publications},
url={http://www.mfsociety.org/../modules/modDashboard/uploadFiles/journals/MJ~626~p16sm2gcsd1vhr1o1ll6t3kasv13.pdf}
keywords={managerial control; hostile takeover; top management turnover; friendly takeover; ownership structure},
abstract={This article investigates the impact that successful hostile and friendly takeovers have on the rates of top management change for U.K. target firms. The results shows that hostile takeovers are associated with a greater degree of both top executive and top team forced departure rates compared to that of friendly takeovers. Furthermore, prior to takeover, hostile targets have lower abnormal returns, lower profitability, higher debt, lower managerial ownership and a high ownership stake held by external block holders relative to friendly targets. The results give further support to the disciplining role of the hostile takeover.},
}